Jason Kirby: Welcome everyone. Welcome back to Fundraising Demystified. Today we have Thanasis D on the show, Managing Partner and Co‑Founder of Proof VC. Welcome to the show, Thanasis.

Thanasis: Yeah. Thank you, Jason, for having me on. Glad to be here.

Jason Kirby: I’m excited to bring you on. And for most of our viewers this will be a different story and narrative, as you’re actually on the capital allocation side—and not just any VC, but a very unique thesis you don’t run across often. It was so unique I wanted you on to share your background and what led you to this thesis. Give the audience a little background on who you are, your history in finance, and what led you to launching Proof.

Thanasis: Sure—and feel free to interrupt me. My background is good context for how we came up with this strategy. I thought I wanted to be an engineer—you can guess from my name. You said “D,” Delistathus is the full Greek name. I came to the U.S. to study electrical engineering. Then I discovered venture after business school, went into a couple of operating roles, and then into venture. I’ve been doing venture since 2000.

We evolved into this strategy—and I’ll tell you what Proof is. In summary, it’s basically an insider‑access strategy. We want access to high‑performing breakout companies that are typically doubling revenue yearly, leaders in their field, with strong unit economics. These rounds are very competitive—the big funds fight to lead the next round. We didn’t want to compete against Sequoia, IVP, NEA, etc. We wanted access without competing. That’s Proof: an insider‑access strategy.

How do we do it? In partnership with seed/early‑stage funds that have the right to invest but don’t have the capital. This ties to my background: we started life as early‑stage VCs. Back in 2004 we had four really great companies out of a seed fund, all doing great, and we got calls from Sequoia, IVP, Mayfield, NEA saying, “We want to lead the next round. Can you work with the team? We’re perfect because of X, Y, Z.”

I thought it was odd: great funds calling us—why? We’d bought a decent chunk of companies (20–25%), so it was about influence. It became obvious we had access—and access was at a premium. From our standpoint we didn’t have the capital. That was the impetus. We created what became the first Opportunity Fund in the U.S. An Opportunity Fund doubles down on your best companies from your early‑stage portfolio via a separate fund. That strategy is established now, but we created the first in 2004.

Proof is an evolution: we don’t just work with one fund (our own). We work with many. It’s a multi‑fund partnership strategy. At any time, we’re talking to ~150 early‑stage funds, identifying promising companies where they’d love more economics, and leveraging those relationships to get into the great companies I mentioned. That’s what we do.

Jason Kirby: Fascinating. I didn’t know you were original pioneers of the Opportunity Fund—it was all the rage recently. Many tried to create them; not all filled or deployed. Let’s go back—was that at Draper you conceptualized it?

Thanasis: Yes. I started at Draper Atlantic, an affiliate of DFJ—Draper Fisher Jurvetson—started by Tim Draper and John Fisher, later Steve Jurvetson. DFJ pioneered partnering with many funds doing seed and leveraging the network. We licensed the Draper name and collaborated, focused on the Mid‑Atlantic.

Jason Kirby: Got it. You then spent a large part of your career founding another fund. Tell us about that and the history.

Thanasis: The DFJ network changed and wasn’t a great fit for where we wanted to go. We started New Atlantic Ventures (NAV), a partnership with another DFJ fund on the East Coast—doing early‑stage investments around 2007–08—and again deployed the Opportunity Fund strategy (did another one). We did that until about 2015. Innovation is more evolution than lightning bolt. After our first and second Opportunity Funds, my partner John Backus and I asked: is this attractive for LPs?

With a portfolio of 50 companies, you won’t have 20 amazing ones. Venture outcomes follow a power‑law: a small percentage generates returns that pay for the rest. So in any fund, if you’re lucky, you might have three or four. That makes an Opportunity Fund less attractive as a standalone product. You also get conflicts: insiders “drink the Kool‑Aid,” without independent assessment; and your pool is small, so you end up including companies that maybe shouldn’t be there. LPs pushed back: focus on what you’re best at—seed/early stage.

Jason Kirby: That makes sense—fewer shots on goal within your own portfolio and bias. Let’s fast‑forward to Proof. You identify that GP‑only opportunity funds aren’t ideal for LPs. You roll out Proof. Walk us through launching, the strategy, and how you build relationships with early‑stage funds to access their pro rata.

Thanasis: It was an evolution and obvious to us as early‑stage investors: we wanted the ability to put more capital into our best companies. Could we build a fund that partners with other VCs, writes checks, and shares our economics with them? That’s the bargain: you give us access; you know the CEO; you have the pro rata right (the right to invest proportional to ownership). A seed fund with 10% ownership has the right to invest 10% of any future round—but fund size can limit you as rounds get larger. We wanted to tap into that.

Where do you start? We talked to seed/early‑stage funds we knew well and had collaborated with. Every one said, “Brilliant idea. When are you up and running? I already have companies to discuss.” We thought raising would be easy. Not so. It was a first fund and a new strategy, and institutional LPs generally avoid unproven strategies—career risk, inside‑baseball questions: How will you get the deals? Will you see the best? Institutions wanted to see 1–3 funds before big checks. So we turned to family offices—more entrepreneurial, often lacking access to these stages. They liked the access story. For our first three funds (we’re on Fund III), most capital came from family offices, HNW individuals, executives, some wealth platforms, and selective institutions who took early risk.

Jason Kirby: Founders don’t often see that side—it’s hard to raise a fund too, especially with an innovative strategy. For that first fund you secured family offices—what about subsequent funds, and how do you deploy capital and pick winners you get access to?

Thanasis: A common question was, “Won’t they give you their worst and keep the best?” We laughed—that’s not how constrained GPs behave. If someone offers you additional capital with shared economics, you deploy it into your best companies (capital is limited). So we already start with a vetted list. But as fiduciaries we evaluate ourselves via a six‑point lens: (1) growth rate (evidence something works); (2) product‑market fit (avoid tech/market risk); (3) strong unit economics; (4) capital‑efficient model; (5) valuation right vs comps; (6) quality, supportive syndicate for rough times.

Jason Kirby: Helpful. For the audience, how do the economics work between you and the partner fund so incentives align and they bring you their best, amplifying their exposure?

Thanasis: Most venture funds aren’t structured to give economics to third parties—the GP typically takes 20% carried interest on profits. We split those profits with the fund that brings us into the deal—50/50 on the deal’s carry. From our partner’s perspective, this is “found” upside if they’re out of capital. They make the trusted intro to the CEO (who ultimately allocates in competitive rounds). We don’t take board seats; we support the early‑stage GP staying relevant longer; we’re a passive, helpful cap‑table partner.

Example: a partner in our network had a $10M seed fund in a great company. We started at Series B and, to date, invested $50M across subsequent rounds. That small seed investor now has $50M of exposure with upside into its best company—potentially more profit than from the rest of the fund. And our profit‑share is on a deal basis, not cross‑collateralized across a fund, so they can realize carry on that single profitable deal far earlier than waiting 6–8 years for fund‑level carry.

We also facilitate LP co‑invest alongside us. Many seed GPs want to offer co‑invest to LPs, but spinning up a special vehicle per deal is operationally heavy (entities, tax, reporting). We’ve built the process and team to do this at scale and quality; some partners even route their LP co‑invest through our vehicle.

Jason Kirby: Exactly—your competition can be LPs who want to double down, but there’s often still a gap you fill.

Thanasis: Right. Increasingly LPs co‑invest, but it’s complex to operationalize. We encourage partners to include their LPs; if there’s remaining allocation, we can partner. We also sometimes facilitate their LPs investing through our structure.

Jason Kirby: Let’s go back to your own fundraising—how did raising Fund II and III change?

Thanasis: Much easier—we had proof points. Fund I was $36M (smaller than we felt we deserved), but we got to work. With smaller checks, our pitch to GPs strengthened because we paired fund checks with LP co‑invest. We share our work with LPs via memos and facilitate directs through our entities. LPs loved it—about $350M has been invested into our portfolio companies via our managed vehicles alongside our funds. Early wins like Beyond Meat (pre‑IPO) created a strong “access” narrative. Fund II was $120M; LPs continued co‑investing. We aim to grow prudently.

Jason Kirby: How did 2021’s bubble impact your strategy and decisions?

Thanasis: 2021 was frothy—more capital supply than demand, rounds closing in 1–2 weeks. You have to move quickly and rely on additional signals. You can’t just sit out; people had been calling the top since 2014. We invested in good companies; some valuations were high so they must grow into them. Our loss ratio so far isn’t different from Fund I to II. We typically invest B or later, so the key is whether valuation is fair. We said “no” a lot—about 39 passes for every “yes.” Over time, high‑quality companies grow into their valuations.

Jason Kirby: Timely congrats on Jackpocket—DraftKings announced an acquisition yesterday. Portfolio company of yours; you posted on LinkedIn. You mentioned three consecutive investments. Anything you can share?

Thanasis: Great story. Jackpocket lets individuals buy lottery tickets on their phone. Most states regulate lotteries; historically you had to buy in person. We looked at two or three companies and felt Jackpocket was best: early successes in key states; CEO Peter Sullivan—tenacious, repeat entrepreneur—working with regulators and building state coverage; strong syndicate. We invested at Series B and reinvested in C and D—happy with the outcome. Fun note: we sourced it via Brian Siambella in New York—he’s such a great picker we brought him in‑house; he’s now a partner.

Jason Kirby: Incredible story. For emerging fund managers considering launching a fund or on Fund I/II, what advice would you share?

Thanasis: Be patient. Make good, long‑term decisions. Invest in good companies. Solo‑GP fundraising has become more common, but cycles vary—and right now it’s not easy. If you can, take a small first close and start investing; it’s easier to showcase your strategy with live deals. Stay consistent and persevere on your core strategy—LPs look for that. It may take a fund cycle to build enough proof points to scale, but that’s the path. We’ve given this advice to many new VCs.

Jason Kirby: Where can people learn more about you and Proof?

Thanasis: proof.vc has a lot about our program. I’m on email at td@proof.vc and on LinkedIn. Shout‑out to our podcast Finding Proof, where we showcase seed/early‑stage funds with strategies like we discussed.

Jason Kirby: Fantastic—we’ll include those in the show notes. Thanks for joining and sharing more about your strategy and thesis. It’s been a pleasure, and we look forward to sharing this with our audience.

Thanasis: Thanks, Jason. I enjoyed it. Thanks for having me.

Jason Kirby: Oh, man.